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Abstract 
Financial intermediaries are ubiquitous in modern society and its impact have been 
exhaustively studied. A particularly vibrant field of research concerns the 
interrelationship between financial and economic development. While much 
research has been carried out on this topic, most only focus on narrow measures of 
both economic and financial development. Hence, this study assumes a wider 
approach by constructing more refined conceptions of financial and economic 
development. Since the field is also divided along methodological lines, we attempt 
to arbitrate the differences by employing both long and short-run econometric 
models. Since some research indicates an income-based response to financial 
development we also fracture our sample according to income. Our results support 
that there is causality between financial development and economic development, 
but that the direction of causality varies with different measures of financial 
development and with income. We also find support for a pronounced effect of 
financial development for lower income-countries. The effects of financial 
intermediation on the growth of RGDP appears to be channelled through capital 
accumulation and the growth of technological innovation.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Where there is no direct power of disposal by leaders over means of production, 
development is in principle impossible without credit (Schumpeter, 2002, p. 106) 
 
Although dramatized, the quote by Schumpeter poignantly evokes the indispensability of the 
infrastructure of finance to the capitalist economy. Financial markets serve to substantially 
magnify the opportunities for individuals and firms to dynamically optimize consumption and 
investment. As noted by Goldsmith (1969, p. 391), a chief function of a mature credit market 
is the separation of individual savings from investment which liberates the individual from her 
first-period budget constraint and allows her to borrow on the present value of her future 
income. Additionally, the existence of financial instruments has the virtue that it “vastly 
enlarges the circle of potential buyers and of potential transactions” (Goldsmith, 1969, p. 392) 
through the elimination of physical inter-personal transactions.  
 
When Schumpeter (2002, p. 107) issued the quote retold above, he did it as part of a treatise on 
the importance of credit and the transfer of “purchasing power”, that is, “the method by which 
development is carried out in a system with private property and division of labor”. It was not 
until the late 1960’s, however, that Schumpeter’s theories underwent more rigorous scientific 
inquiry and empirical testing. Goldsmith’s pivotal 1969-study traced the beneficial effect of 
financial development on growth to its capacity to increase the efficiency of investment by 
maximizing marginal rates of return and facilitating higher rates of capital accumulation. 
Financial instruments also serve to remedy the “indivisibility” (Goldsmith, 1969, p. 393) of 
certain investments that plague many entrepreneurs with diminutive initial endowments. Many 
such entrepreneurs are faced with prohibitively high initial investment costs, making lucrative 
production processes unrealizable, despite the promise of high future returns. Indeed, as 
McKinnon shows, in the case of underdeveloped statist economies with virtually no capital 
market integration and thus non-existent opportunities for external financing, self-financing is 
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the sole resort for these entrepreneurs. Consequently, entrepreneurs deprived of financing are 
caught in “a low-level equilibrium trap, where innovation is completely blocked” (McKinnon, 
1973, p. 13) which renders an economy unable to fully harness its productive capabilities. 
Financial systems also add tremendously to reducing information and transaction costs, spur 
technological innovation, exert corporate control and diversify risk (Levine, 1997, pp. 690-91).  
 
Naturally, a possibility is for the direction of causality to be reversed or simultaneous. The issue 
of causality was tackled by Joan Robinson as early as 1952 where she reverses the direction of 
causality, embodied neatly in the quote “Where enterprise leads, finance follows” (Robinson, 
1952, p. 86). While Goldsmith was non-committal on the issue (Goldsmith, 1969, p. 48), Levine 
forcefully defends the unidirectional direction of causality from financial development to 
economic development (Levine & King, 1993, p. 730) but others have found differing results 
(as will be discussed in the literature review). Not only issues of causality have emerged to 
complicate the picture, but also different degree of development. As countries climb from 
underdeveloped to developed evidence indicates that the gain of financial development 
diminishes (De Gregorio & Guidotti 1995), (Hansson & Jonung 1997) etc. What is uncontested, 
however, is that the topic of finance and growth has grown ever more complex as increasingly 
advanced econometric techniques are used to explore a wider variety of mechanisms and a 
broader selection of samples.  
1.2 Purpose & Research Question 
While the relationship between financial development and economic growth has been subjected 
to wide scrutiny, most studies have been conducted with varying methodologies, samples and 
variables. The plethora of approaches renders difficult any comparison and ultimately 
arbitration between contradictory results. By basing results on associations between one or two 
operationalizations of a phenomenon that may be more fractured and complex, these proxies 
may assume the effects of variables omitted from the specification. Furthermore, the samples 
employed in many of the studies are sparsely motivated and, in some cases, may be too short 
for reliable inference. This study aims to redress these shortcomings by carefully surveying the 
field of research to combine existing measures of financial development and economic 
development. Furthermore, by offering a fine-grained conception of financial development and 
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isolating those aspects of the financial system that are more relevant for growth, decisionmakers 
are better equipped to devise targeted measures to induce growth and prevent stagnation.  
 
The study starts from Ross Levine’s model of the economy but is by no means limited to his 
selection of variables, sample or methodology but since his studies are comprehensive and 
extensively quoted, his work represents an appropriate starting point. Furthermore, to delineate 
the focus of our study we need to declare what is meant by financial intermediaries. For that 
purpose, we make common cause with Levine with the definition of financial intermediaries 
as: “coalition of agents that combine to provide financial services” (Levine, 1997, p. 693). 
Furthermore, while previous studies remain inconclusive as to the effect of financial 
development and economic growth and its direction of causality, the differences can be largely 
divided along methodological lines. With one exception, the studies employing panel data-
regression techniques find a positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth (with the direction of causality more disputed). Conversely, the studies attempting to 
model cointegration between financial development and economic growth through error-
correction-models are more prone to reject any effect between the variables. Some studies that 
find a positive relationship tends to emphasize how the effect is mediated by income status, 
where lower income is more conducive to a positive relationship. Since an important difference 
between Vector Error-Correction Models (VECM) and panel-regressions is that VECM is able 
to account for any long-term relationship between variables while panel-regressions only 
estimate the short-term relationship, a possibility is that the inconclusive results are due to a 
fading effect of financial development on economic development over time.  This pattern of 
methodological bifurcation prompts us to employ a mixed-methods approach to accurately 
model the long - and short-run dynamics. While the short-run dynamics are captured by panel-
data regressions, we capture the long-run dynamics through an alternative approach to VEC 
that models long-term relationships without exploiting cointegration. This approach allows us 
to isolate both the effects of income and methodology. These techniques will be applied to a 
sample consisting of the 28 member-states of the European Union to ensure as little variability 
as possible on aspects other than the variables examined. Data availability limits the period 
considered to range from the years 1995-2014. 
 
As alluded to initially, the direction of causality between financial development and economic 
development may well be reversed. It is conceivable that financial intermediation emerges as 
the result of the necessities of economic development, along the same lines as recounted above. 
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In Robert Lucas’ treatise on the factors of economic development he declares the significance 
of financial development on economic growth to be “very badly over-stressed” (Lucas, 1988, 
p. 6) and aligns himself with the neoclassical dichotomy between monetary and real variables. 
Even so, theory on the mechanisms of reverse causality are hard-found and sparsely developed 
and Lucas and Robinson do not convert their convictions into empirical testing or concrete 
hypotheses. Nonetheless, as revealed by the literature review, the considerable number of 
findings of bi-directional or reverse causality merits thorough investigation. 
The limited theoretical exploration of the causality running from economic development to 
financial development leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypotbesis: Financial development causes economic development. 
 
Generating the following research questions by which the study will abide: 
 
1. Does financial development cause economic development? 
 
2. How does financial development cause economic development? 
 
Where the first addresses causality and the second concerns the mechanism through which the 
causality is channeled. The definitions of economic and financial development will be 
thoroughly defined in chapter 3.  
 
The organization of the study proceeds as follows: In the following chapter, chapter 2, a survey 
of previous research is conducted with the purpose of highlighting the plurality and deficiencies 
of the field. The survey is then used to inform the construction of our theoretical model found 
in chapter 3. Apart from the presentation of our theoretical model and variable definitions, 
chapter 3 includes the theoretical mechanisms linking financial and economic development. 
The theoretical construct guides the practical data collection process that gives rise to chapter 
4 where the data is presented and discussed. Chapter 5 presents the empirical model and 
conducts the necessary tests and specifications but also contains results and analysis. Finally, 
chapter 6 concludes the study by revisiting the research questions and presenting wider 
implications of the study and suggests sources of further research.    
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2 Literature Review 
Ever since McKinnon, Shaw and Goldsmith trained focus on the linkage between financial 
infrastructure and economic prosperity, scores of researchers have followed in their footsteps, 
experimenting with wide arrays of methodologies and measurements. Notably, Ross Levine’s 
work has contributed immensely to both the theoretical and empirical understanding of finance 
and growth. In his seminal study with King (King & Levine, 1993) and further studies some 
years later Levine (1997) and Levine & Zervos (1998) offer a comprehensive and fine-grained 
exposition on the channels through which financial development stimulates GDP-growth and 
other macroeconomic variables. More specifically, King & Levine proxies financial 
development by the magnitude of outstanding credit to the private sector which they measure 
as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. They also employ the ratio of money bank deposit assets/ 
deposit assets plus central bank domestic assets as well as different measures of liquidity to 
measure financial sophistication. Their fracturing of the dependent variable into three channels 
of growth in the form of GDP-growth per capita, domestic investment to GDP and the rate of 
physical capital accumulation contrasts with Goldsmith’s simple use of GNP per capita. In the 
1998-study Levine & Zervos expand the measurements of financial development to include 
stock market variables to further operationalize liquidity and slightly modifies the dependent 
variables by substituting investment to GDP and the rate of physical accumulation for the 
growth-rate of the per capita capital-stock and total factor productivity growth. Employing both 
cross-section and pooled time-series, separate cross-section regressions and initial-value 
regressions they are able to produce strongly positive associations between the financial 
variables and their dependent variables as well as infer that “finance does not only follow 
growth; finance seems importantly to lead growth” (King & Levine, 1993, p. 730).  
 
Contemporaneous to Levine’s studies, De Gregorio & Guidotti (1995), considered how regional 
and income-related aspects mediate the effects of financial development on average RGDP per 
capita-growth in an examination of 100 countries over a 20-year period. They find evidence 
consistent with Levine’s results albeit to varying degrees “according to regions, time periods 
and levels of income” (De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995, p. 434). The effect appears most 
pronounced in low and middle-income countries with diminished effect for high-income 
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countries. They point out, however that since their operationalization of the magnitude of 
financial intermediation consists of credit granted to the private sector by commercial banks 
and the central bank, they will be unable to register effects for countries whose financial 
development is concentrated largely outside the banking system, as is largely the case for high-
income countries. A notable outlier to this result is that of Latin America, which in fact displays 
a significant negative relationship between financial development and growth. Coupled with 
the result for high-income countries these results emphasize important limitations to Levine’s 
positive findings. The case of Latin America, the authors argue, illustrates how the quality of 
financial intermediation may interact with growth as opposed to merely its size. Another 
important contrast with Levine’s work is their dismissal of measurements of money-supply 
(such as M1/M2) as proxies for financial development. Their skepticism stems from the 
possibility that since M2 includes the more liquid components of M1, factors other than 
financial depth may influence its size. Their concern is shared and articulated more thoroughly 
by Demetriades & Hussein (Demetriades & Hussein 1996) since an increase in M2 “may reflect 
more extensive use of currency rather than an increase in the volume of bank deposits” 
(Demetriades & Hussein, 1996, p. 395). Their critique, however, does not serve to invalidate 
Levine’s results since their proxy for financial intermediation is indeed included among 
Levine’s lineup, but it does suggest a need for the elimination of measures of monetary variables 
in further studies. 
 
The study by the aforementioned Demetriades & Hussein differs mainly in its methodological 
approach. Instead of panel-data regressions they draw on models exploiting cointegration 
relationships, namely the VECM within the general Vector Auto-regression (VAR) framework. 
Their study employs time-series data over 16 countries regressing RGDP per capita onto 
financial development, operationalized as the ratio of bank deposit liabilities to nominal GDP 
and as the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to nominal GDP. The first measure is 
accounted for earlier, but the second measure of financial development is introduced to control 
for macroprudential actions from the central bank (such as altering reserve requirements). Such 
actions could leave the supply of credit unaffected while impacting bank deposit liabilities. 
Despite the shortcomings of bank deposit liabilities they defend its inclusion by arguing that 
together the measures serve to “provide some more refined information regarding competing 
theoretical explanations” (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996, p. 395). Their findings rebuff 
Levine’s results in reversing the causality between financial development and RGPD or can be 
found to be bi-directional.  
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The mid 1990’s popularized the use of VEC-models, not only for larger samples but for more 
involved case studies of a single observation. In their 1997 article “Finance and Economic 
Growth: The Case of Sweden 1834-1991” Hansson & Jonung use the VECM to study the long-
term relationship between RGDP per capita and total domestic credit per capita. Their results 
corroborate the notion of the response of economic growth to financial development as varying 
with income. By fracturing the sample period into three periods, the authors are able study the 
interrelationship between financial development and economic growth in the transition between 
different levels of income. While they find a positive effect of financial development on growth, 
they also find that it diminishes with income as Sweden attains high-income status. Since their 
measure of financial development is based on commercial bank credit their results parallel those 
of De Gregorio & Guidotti in finding a weaker effect of financial development on growth as 
income increases.  
 
By comparison, two studies on comparatively low or middle-income countries seem to confirm 
the hypothesis of a response conditioned on income. Ghildiyal, Pokhriyal & Mohan (2015) use 
an ARDL-model to study the evolution of the relationship between financial development and 
RGDP per capita. Echoing Levine & Zervos they proxy financial development as stock-market 
and banking sector development and find unidirectional positive causality from financial 
development to economic growth (Ghildiyal et al, 2015). Mirdala shows that the effect may 
extend to middle-income economies in his study of ten European transition economies over an 
eleven-year period (Mirdala, 2012). Opting for a multiequation VEC-model and the broad 
money stock (M3) to GDP as well as domestic bank deposits to GDP and domestic bank loans 
to GDP he tries to model the long-term relationship with RGDP per Capita. The study enables 
him to conclude that “Especially countries with lower GDP per capita seem to benefit from 
financial deepening as the financial deepening indicators affects real economic activity with 
higher intensity in the short-run and Granger cause real output in the long-run” (Mirdala, 2012, 
p. 192-93).  
 
However, the result that the relationship between financial development and economic growth 
for low-income countries is unambiguously positive is far from disputed. For example, Ahmed, 
Horner & Rafiq use panel-data on a selection of developing economies over 30 years and in 
contrast with earlier findings, they are not able to prove any significant positive effect on either 
RGDP or RGDP per capita, in fact, domestic credit expansion impacts both variables 
negatively.  
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Not only for low-income countries has the relationship between financial development and 
growth has been closely scrutinized but also for high-income countries. Cecchetti & Kharroubi 
explore potential channels through which income mediates the effects of financial development 
on growth and conceive of it as an “inverted U-shaped effect” (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012, 
p. 14). There comes a point, they argue, where “more banking and more credit are associated 
with lower growth” (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012, p. 1) and the financial sector crowds out 
more productive investment in the struggle for scarce resources. Using panel-data regression 
techniques on a sample of 50 emerging and advanced economies over 30 years they are able to 
compute turning points for when the relationship transitions from positive to negative. Their 
measures of financial development are private credit to GDP for which they estimate a turning 
point of 100% and financial sector employment share out of total employment for which they 
compute a turning point of 3.5%. After having exceeded that percentage, they estimate that a 
1.6% growth in employment share is responsible for roughly one half of a percentage point 
decrease in RGDP per worker. 
 
Apart from the more comprehensive studies, individual studies have focused on developing 
appropriate measures for the efficiency of the financial system. Notably, Candida Ferreira’s 
2012 article “Bank Performance and Economic Growth: Evidence from Granger Panel 
Causality Estimations” (Candida Ferreira 2012) link measures of bank performance and 
efficiency to financial development and prove bi-directional causality using a panel-data 
approach with reference to RGDP per capita and the gross fixed capital formation. Additionally, 
Greenwood, Sanchez & Wang argue along the lines of De Gregorio & Guidotti that the 
magnitude of available credit may be misleading if the services of financial intermediaries are 
of poor quality. Thus, they propose that the relationship between financial development and 
growth is lacking without a measure of the efficiency of financial intermediaries. As a proxy 
for efficiency they propose to use the interest rate spread between the interest rate charged to 
borrowers and that offered to savers. Since the interest-spread represents the profit-margin for 
financial intermediaries, its magnitude has the same implication as ordinary prices, with a lower 
margin indicating a more efficient intermediary (Greenwood et al, 2012, p. 1).  
 
For purposes of clarity, the findings described above have been summarized into a table 
found below. The table lists the most important properties of each article, such as 
methodology and since one of the objectives of this study is to synthesize the 
operationalisations of financial development employed in previous research and mediate 
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between them, key dependent and independent variables are also included as categories 
in the table.  
 
Table 1 – Selection of previous research with variables estimated, method and sample 
Author Measure of Financial 
Development 
Dependent 
variable 
Methodology 
 
Sample 
Cechetti & 
Kharroubi 
(2012) 
Private credit/GDP & 
Financial sector share 
of employment 
GDP/Worker-
growth 
Panel data 
regression 
 
50 countries 
from 1980-2009 
Candida 
Ferreira 
(2013) 
Bank Performance: 
Bank Return on Assets 
 Bank efficiency: 
Return on Equity 
RGDP/Capita 
Gross fixed 
capital formation 
growth 
Panel data 
regression with 
granger causality 
tests 
 
27 EU-member 
states from 
1996-2008 
Greenwood 
Sanchez & 
Wang 
(2012) 
Financial 
intermediation 
efficiency: Interest 
Rate Spread 
RGDP/capita Cross-section & 
Panel regressions 
 
45 countries 
From 1974-
2004 
Levine 
(1997) 
Financial Depth: 1) 
liquid liabilities of the 
financial system 
(currency plus demand 
and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and 
nonbank financial 
intermediaries/GDP 
2) Credit allocated to 
private enterprises/total 
domestic credit 
3) Credit to private 
enterprises/GDP 
4) total value of shares 
traded on a country’s 
exchanges/stock 
markets 
5) total value of shares 
traded on a country’s 
exchanges/total stock 
market capitalization 
 
RGPD/Capita-
growth 
Average rate of 
growth in the 
capital 
stock/person 
Total productivity 
growth 
Cross-Section and 
Panel data 
 
80 countries 
from 1960-1989 
De Gregorio 
& Guidotti 
(1995) 
Domestic credit to the 
private sector/GDP 
Average 
GDP/capita-
growth 
Cross section and 
Panel data 
regressions 
 
100 countries 
1960-1985 
Levine & 
King (1993) 
Same as 1997 article by 
Levin 
RGDP-
growth/capita 
Rate of physical 
capital 
accumulation 
Ratio of domestic 
investment/GDP 
 
Cross-section and 
panel data 
 
80 countries 
from 1960-1989 
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Demetriades 
& Hussein 
(1996) 
Ratio of bank 
deposits/Nominal GDP 
Ratio of bank claims on 
the private 
sector/Nominal GDP 
RGDP/Capita 
In domestic 
currencies 
VECM 
 
16 countries 
 
Mirdala 
(2012) 
Broad money 
stock/GDP 
Domestic bank 
deposits/GDP 
Domestic bank 
loans/GDP 
RGDP/capita Multiequation 
VECM 
 
10 European 
countries from 
2000-2011 
Syed 
Ahmed, 
James 
Horner & 
Rafiqul 
Bhuyan 
Rafiq (2008) 
Quasi-money (M1/bank 
deposits)  
Ratio of M2/GDP 
Ratio of private 
domestic 
credit/nominal GDP 
RGDP-growth Panel data 
regressions 
 
Case Studies on 
three countries 
from 1970-2000 
Ghildiyal, 
Pokhriyal & 
Mohan 
(2015) 
M2/GDP 
Stock Market 
Development (Ratio of 
stock market 
capitalization/GDP) 
Banking Sector 
Development (Ratio of 
domestic credit/GDP) 
RGDP/capita Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag 
Model Bound 
Testing 
Technique 
 
Case Study of 
one country 
from 1990-2014 
Pontus 
Hansson & 
Lars Jonung 
(1997) 
Bank loans/GDP RGDP/capita VECM Case study of 
one country 
from 1834-1991 
Ross Levine 
& Sara 
Zervos 
(1998) 
Value-traded ratio and 
the turnover-ratio 
RGDP/capita 
growth 
Growth of the 
capital stock 
Productivity 
growth 
Panel-data 
regressions 
32 countries 
from 1976-1993 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Financial development & Growth  
As discussed briefly in the introduction, Goldsmith’s and McKinnon’s work showed how 
fragmented capital markets and efficient provision of credit limits the opportunity of 
entrepreneurs to realize projects with high future profitability. Absent unified capital markets, 
competition between issuers of credit is unlikely to drive lending rates to equilibrium levels and 
ensure the efficient allocation of land and capital (McKinnon, 1973, p. 8). The theory of capital 
fragmentation represents a cornerstone in the challenge of neoclassical theories of finance and 
the neat division between monetary and real variables. Most importantly the theory of capital 
fragmentation challenges three vital assumptions of neoclassical theory: 
 
1) Capital markets are fully competitive and lack transaction costs.  
2) “Inputs and outputs are perfectly divisible” (McKinnon, 1973, p. 43), that is, 
investment costs are continuous rather than discrete. 
3) “Money plays no direct role in capital accumulation”(ibid) 
 
Thus, capital market inefficiencies arise to disturb several key functions of financial systems. 
Ross Levine codifies and extends the thoughts of Goldsmith, McKinnon and others in issuing 
four functions of efficient financial systems that impact economic development: 
 
Facilitating Risk Diversification 
Financial institutions serve to ameliorate two sources of risk; liquidity risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. By reducing information and transaction costs financial institutions eliminate the risk that 
illiquid assets are not readily convertible into more liquid assets (Levine, 1997, p. 692). Savers 
that are exposed to idiosyncratic shocks are less prone to commit to investing in the long-term 
projects that are required by most entrepreneurs. Financial institutions, and banks in particular, 
shield savers against liquidity risk by offering a mixture of high and low-return with 
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respectively low and high liquidity. By facilitating investment in high-return projects, an 
economy is able to further harness its productive capabilities and increase capital accumulation 
and thus increase growth. Furthermore, the rate of technological innovation is also likely to 
benefit from increased investment. In competing for credit, entrepreneurs continuously work to 
gain advantages and produce externalities that contribute to the acceleration of overall 
technological change (Levine, 1997, p. 694).  
 
Information acquisition, Corporate Control and Allocation 
Absent financial institutions, ordinary savers when contemplating firms to invest in would have 
to ascertain the profitability of the firm. However, most savers are unlikely to have the time or 
capacity to collect and process enough information to make a meaningful assessment and even 
if they could, savers would have to incur a perhaps prohibitively high fixed cost. Financial 
institutions thus emerge to consolidate information acquisition and by aggregation, reduce the 
costs of monitoring individual firms. The aggregation of information acquisition and processing 
has the added effect of endowing institutions with the expertise to properly evaluate firm credit 
applications. Firms, being aware that credit is contingent on firm profitability, will strive toward 
greatest possible efficiency and capital will flow to the most efficient firms and with the most 
profitable production technology, improving resource allocation (Levine, 1997, p. 695). Since 
creditors are unable to monitor day-to-day business, financial institutions make arrangements 
that compel managers to accommodate the interests of creditors (Levine, 1997, p. 696).  
 
Mobilizing Savings 
In keeping with Goldsmith and McKinnon, financial institutions arise to pool individual saving 
surpluses and pair them with entrepreneurs unable to self-finance their investment-projects. By 
pooling savings, risk-averse savers are able to diversify their portfolios by owning smaller 
fractions in multiple investment-projects. Through the creation of small denomination-
instruments financial institutions enable savers to purchase shares of firms instead of entire 
firms (Levine, 1997, p. 699). By improving resource allocation and capital accumulation, the 
pooling of savings influences growth positively. 
 
Facilitating Exchange 
Another significant function of the financial system is to allow for greater specialization. If 
firms and entrepreneurs can dedicate themselves to a limited number of products or production 
processes, innovative practices are more likely to ensue (Levine, 1997, p. 700). Complete 
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specialization requires a large number of transactions, however, and with non-negligible 
transaction costs, trade between specialized agents would be limited or non-existent. 
Furthermore, informational asymmetries in the trade of goods and services are mitigated 
significantly by the ability of “recognizable mediums” (Levine, 1997, p. 700) such as financial 
institutions to evaluate attributes and ensure the quality of the good or service under transaction. 
Consequently, a vital precondition for innovation and growth is the existence of an efficient 
financial system to service the transactional and informational requirements of a specialized 
economy.  
 
The flowchart below illustrates the channel through which financial intermediaries resolve 
market inefficiencies and how that promotes growth. The flowchart is borrowed largely from 
Levine but is presented with slight modifications (Levine, 1997, p. 691). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Flowchart illustrating the role of financial intermediaries 
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3.2 Theoretical Model 
In constructing our model of the economy, we draw from Levine & King’s model where growth 
is decomposed into capital accumulation and a residual (Levine & King, 1993, p.722). Our 
hypothesis is that if financial development impacts economic development, it does so through 
the mechanisms of capital accumulation and technological innovation. Consequently, fracturing 
economic development into three components serves not only to investigate the association 
between financial and economic development in general but also to propose and isolate causal 
mechanisms. Thus, the economy can be described by the following production function: 
 
𝑦 = 𝑘𝛼𝑥 
 
Where in contrast to Levine & King who use RGDP per capita, y represents RGDP per hours 
(or labor productivity) As it turns out, substituting RGDP per capita for RGDP per hours worked 
per worker1 maintains the ability to measure the productive capacity of an economy with the 
added benefit of controlling for shifts in the composition of the workforce (Fregert & Jonung, 
2012, p. 155) (an approach also assumed by Cecchetti & Kharroubi). This study takes the cue 
of Levine & King and defines 𝑘𝛼 as the capital stock deflated by worked hours, weighted by 
the share of capital in production. The variable 𝑥 contains several variables and is intended as 
a residual in Levine & King’s study. They include among others: human capital accumulation, 
increases in the number of hours worked. We side with Levine’s later study (Levine 1997) in 
defining the residual as total factor productivity growth (TFPG) and will act as a proxy for 
technological innovation (comparable to the Solow-residual (Jones & Vollrath, 2013, p. 46)) 
and subsequently control for the effects of the quality human capital by including school 
enrolment rates as a control variable. 
 
To accurately model financial development, quite a substantial number of aspects need to be 
accounted for. A fruitful starting point is to consider the extent to which financial intermediaries 
allocate credit to the wide economy. To this end, we follow in the footsteps of Levine & King, 
Demetriades & Hussein etc, and proxy domestic credit with domestic assets held by deposit 
money banks to total domestic credit. Furthermore, since growth hinges on the ability of private 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Technical definitions are available in the data-section. 
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enterprise and entrepreneurs to secure credit, financial development can be captured by the 
degree to which credit is allocated to private enterprise as a share of total domestic credit. 
Levine & King argue that high values of this ratio signal a more diligent and efficient financial 
system (Levine & King, 1993, p. 705). To control for size of the economy we also include 
private domestic credit as a fraction of RGDP on the advice of De Gregorio & Guidotti, Syed 
Ahmed et al, Ghildiyal et al, Demetriades & Hussein2 and Cecchetti & Kharroubi).  
 
A few authors (Levine & King, Mirdala and Syed Ahmed etc) employ measures of the monetary 
stock such as liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand deposits) to 
measure the ability of the financial system to provide liquidity. However, as a measure of 
financial development, this measure may be misleading. As noted by both Demetriades & 
Hussein and De Gregorio & Guidotti, measures of the money stock are more relevant in 
measuring “the extent to which transactions are monetized than with the degree of financial 
intermedation” (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996, p. 395) since it includes currency and where 
many financially underdeveloped economies rely disproportionately on currency, high values 
may be construed as financial sophistication when it is in fact indicative of the opposite. The 
capacity to provide highly liquid assets is still a key function of the financial system, however, 
and omission of a liquidity measure is likely to neglect a potentially important determinant of 
economic development. Fortunately, Levine & Zervos (1998) does provide alternative 
measures of liquidity. Both variables are derived from the stock market with the first being the 
value traded ratio (total value of shares traded on a country’s exchanges to GDP) with the 
second being the turnover ratio (total value of shares traded on a country’s stock exchanges to 
stock market capitalization) (Levine, 1997, p. 712). Both variables measure the presence of 
transaction costs in equity markets where higher values signal lower transaction costs and, 
consequently, higher liquidity. They differ in that the turnover ratio controls for the size of the 
stock market. The turnover ratio is thus a helpful indicator of the liquidity of smaller markets 
(in absolute value terms). While we expect both liquidity indicators to be positively associated 
with economic development, the turnover ratio should have a more pronounced effect for the 
low-income group and vice-versa for the value traded ratio. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Syed Ahmed et al and Demetriades & Hussein actually deflate by nominal GDP, but to control for differing 
price levels we use real GDP. 
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Apart from the magnitude of private credit, De Gregorio & Guidotti (De Gregorio & Guidotti, 
1995, p. 434) and Greenwood et al note that economic development is also contingent on the 
efficiency of the financial system. In devising our first proxy for financial intermediary 
efficiency we proceed on the advice of Greenwood et al and introduce the interest-rate spread. 
The difference between the deposit and lend-rate is a useful indicator of efficiency since it 
measures the costs of financial intermediacy. Efficiency implies lower interest-rate margins 
and, consequently, a negative relationship with economic development.  
 
Efficiency can also be measured from the vantage point of specific intermediaries. While the 
importance of banks in providing credit to the private sector has been shown to vary with 
income (see Jonung & Hansson and De Gregorio & Guidotti), they are still a staple of many 
economies. Nonetheless, the relationship is expected to diminish with income. As suggested by 
Candida Ferreira, we include two variables related to bank performance and efficiency, namely 
the return on individual bank assets (ROA) and the return on equity for the entire banking sector 
(ROE). The ROA is defined as the ratio of net income to total bank assets and the ROE is 
defined as net income to bank equity. Measuring the ROA is a straightforward way of 
evaluating the profitability of individual banks as well as the quality of their management 
(Candida Ferreira, 2013, p. 11).  Return on equity is an indicator not only of the efficiency of 
individual banks but of the entire banking sector. Since shareholders are interested in 
maximizing share value, a large value of the ratio indicates successful corporate control, an 
aspect enumerated as growth-inducing by Levine (Levine 1997).    
 
Our model of the economy also includes control variables to account for non-financial 
components of RGDP. Our choices are guided largely by Levine & King as well as Jonung & 
Hansson and includes a proxy for human capital (school enrollment), inflation and foreign trade 
(described more thoroughly below).  
3.2.1 Income & Financial Development 
Absolute levels of RGDP (or income) have tentatively been shown to be a key factor in 
analyzing the relationship between financial and economic development. Since previous 
research has found that financial development exhibits a diminishing or negative effect on 
economic development as income increases, a suitable division is between high and low-income 
countries. Bracketing income is nettlesome both generally; any classification tends to be 
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somewhat arbitrary and in particular to this study; it can be argued that the EU-members share 
largely similar income levels. However, an objection to this assessment may be constructed 
from the findings of Rajmund Mirdala. As mentioned earlier, Mirdala finds positive effects of 
financial development on RGDP per-capita using the VEC-model on 10 European transition 
economies3 (ETE) (Mirdala, 2012, p.1). In light of the fact that he is alone in reaching these 
findings by means of a VEC-model, this might indicate that the income status of his sample 
conspired to yield the positive results. However, upon examination of actual GDP-data 
presented in figure 2, this storyline is not beyond scrutiny. The values reported at the start of 
the sample (i.e. 1995) confirm that GDP-numbers for the ETE-economies are all indeed below 
the rest of the sample. However, as time progresses, the inadequacies of the ETE as a low-
income segment is revealed as three countries (Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) 
overtake the countries with lowest income in the rest of the sample.  These three countries 
notwithstanding, however, the GDP-numbers for the ETE do consistently linger at the bottom 
of the sample. 
Figure 2 – Growth of GDP per worker in Europe 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 The European transition economies are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
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Nevertheless, the fact is that even if the ETE-income levels would remain consistently below 
the rest of the sample, the division would remain somewhat arbitrary. Common to the ETE, 
however, is their transition from centrally-planned economies to market economies at the outset 
of the 1990’s. Consequently, Mirdala labels them “financially underdeveloped economies” 
(ibid) on account of their immature financial infrastructure. To segment the EU into two 
brackets can arguably be warranted based on, if not income disparities, the discrepancy in 
relative degrees of financial development. Since our empirical model relies on homogenous 
samples, this division would appear sensible. From here on the ETE-economies will be referred 
to as the emerging segment, while the other segment will be identified as the developed 
segment. 
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4 Data & Restrictions 
 
4.1 Sources of data 
This study uses two separate datasets that consists of a panel of 17 respectively 10 European 
countries with yearly observations of fifteen different variables stretching from 1995 up until 
2014. The final sets used in the different regression analyses where compiled using two main 
sources. Those are the Total Economic Database (TED) produced and published by The 
Conference Board and the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). In 
addition to those two main sources we also collected data from the World Bank’s World 
Development indicators and the Barro-Lee dataset on educational attainment, also distributed 
by the World bank. All datasets are available from the webpages of the individual organizations. 
4.2 Variables 
The full datasets consist of fifteen different variables which are described below, with the 
variable shorthand in parenthesis. Of those fifteen, three are dependent variables and twelve are 
independent variables. Three of the independent variables are used to control for other potential 
sources of economic growth. The three dependent variables are real GDP per hours worked, 
gross fixed capital formation per hours worked and total factor productivity growth. Real GDP 
per hours worked (GDP_AVGHR) is calculated by using real GDP per employed person 
divided by average hours worked and the number of people employed. The variable is 
normalized across the different countries in the sense that national GDP and employment 
statistics are collected using a set of international guidelines given by the UN (Vries and 
Erumban, 2016, p. 5).  
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Total factor productivity growth (TFPG) considers labour as well as all kinds of capital, both 
physical and other, as inputs that create production of both products and services. However, 
TFPG is not a variable that is calculated directly but rather obtained as a residual when 
measuring all factors that contribute to growth in output (Vries and Erumban, 2016, p 16).  
 
The final dependent variable, gross fixed capital formation per hours worked (K_AVGHR) is 
defined as all capital investments divided by average hours worked and the number of people 
employed. Gross fixed capital formation includes, amongst other things, land improvements, 
machinery purchases and the construction of roads (UN data 2016). 
The explanatory variables, excluding control variables, are before tax return on assets (ROA), 
before tax return on equity (ROE), net interest margin (NIM), deposit money bank assets to 
total bank assets (DEP_TOT), private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP (DEP_GDP), stock market total value traded to GDP (STOCK_TOT) and 
stock market turnover ratio (TURNOVER_RATIO). Return on assets, return on equity and net 
interest margin are measures of the efficiency of financial intermediaries, i.e. banks. The ROA 
is measured as the percentage of bank income to yearly assets while the ROE is measured as 
the percentage of income to yearly equity (World Bank 2015).  
 
The two credit measures, private credit by deposit money banks to total bank assets and private 
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions, net interest margin as well as the 
two stock-market measures, stock market total value traded and stock market turnover ratio, are 
all measures of financial depth, that is, measures of the financial sector relative to the size of 
the economy. Deposit money bank assets to total bank assets is expressed as the ratio between 
claims on the domestic sector by deposit money banks to the total claims on the domestic sector 
by both commercial banks and the central bank. Private credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions is the total amount of credit by banks and other financial entities to 
GDP. Net interest margin is the interest revenue as a share of average interest bearing assets. 
Stock market total value traded is the value of all stocks traded on the stock market to GDP 
while stock market turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded over the one-year period 
divided by average market capitalization (World Bank 2015). 
 
The three control variables (ibid) are average yearly inflation ratio (INF_A) average years of 
total schooling ages fifteen and up (SCHOOLING) and trade as a share of GDP (TRADE). 
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4.3 Issues and restrictions 
The availability of reliable data for the variables of concern is limited for some of the current 
member states of the European union, thus restricting the scope of this paper. It is most apparent 
in the case of Croatia where some variables are entirely unavailable, thus forcing us to omit the 
country from the study. Overall, financial data for eastern European countries is almost or 
entirely unavailable before the mid-90s whereas it exists from 1980 for most other countries. 
To create datasets with comparable groups of countries any observation before 1995 is therefore 
disregarded.  
 
Despite limiting the dataset there are still some issues with missing variables. Average 
educational attainment (SCHOOLING) is, to our knowledge, only available as a five-year 
average. In order to create a balanced dataset those five-year averages have been allowed to 
represent average education attainment for each year of the respective five-year periods. 
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5 Results & Discussion 
5.1 Econometric Approach 
In determining how to approach the study empirically, it is useful to consult previous research. 
As noted earlier, the field is neatly divided between practitioners of panel-data regression 
approaches and VAR-based VEC-models. Panel-data regressions are indeed what enabled 
Levine & King to reach their seminal results and appear to be the self-evident resort when 
considering both cross-section and time-series data. In contrast to Levine & King we instead fit 
a dynamic model without contemporary variables, not on the grounds that contemporary 
realizations are not necessarily interesting but because this elides the problem of simultaneity. 
Lagged realizations of a variable could well have an impact on the dependent variable one 
period ahead, but the reverse is highly unlikely and have the convenient property of being 
correlated with its contemporary realizations, making them ideal instruments.   
 
Another attractive feature of panel-data regressions is that the researcher is able to control for 
factors that are omitted from the specified equation, thus solving any simultaneity issues. This 
is accomplished by replacing the intercept with an individual-specific intercept that varies over 
cross-sections. Fixed effects (FE) are common when the cross-sections come in the form of 
countries, or more generally as “one of a kind” (Verbeek, 2012, p. 384) and the decision to 
apply FE is often justified in comparison with random effects (RV) where the RV-specification 
means treating the intercept as a random-variable. In determining whether to opt for RV or FE, 
a central criterion is whether any of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error-term 
where such correlation disqualifies the use of RV (Verbeek, 2012, p. 385). As mentioned 
earlier, however, the problem of endogeneity is skirted by the FE-specification and since it is 
unlikely that economic development is governed solely by financial development and that the 
measures of financial development are uncorrelated with any omitted determinants of economic 
development, the FE-specification is favoured. While the typical method when discriminating 
between fixed and random effects is to apply the Hausman-test the ratio of cross-sections to 
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coefficients in our estimation makes such a test impossible to perform. In addition, despite that 
the Hausman-test is often applied it is not a tool without fault. The procedure is prone to having 
low power, circumscribing its benefit as results may be severely biased (Verbeek, 2012, p. 386). 
The choice of including fixed effects is also supported by running a simple F-test that checks if 
the FE-dummies are insignificant or not. Testing reveals that the country specific effects are 
significant for all test-specifications. Given the amount of observations that the panel data 
approach allows for it also means that the assumption of normality, in this large sample, 
becomes a non-issue (Lumley et al, 2002). 
 
 Having said that, we are now able to convert the model conceived in the theory-section into 
mathematical equations suitable for empirical estimation. Note that since there is good reason 
to suspect the presence of unit roots in some of the variables4, they are defined in differences 
(with the exception of ROA, ROE, TFPG, NIM and INF_A, since they are percentages). Indeed, 
Levine & King (Levine & King 1993) explicitly difference their data while others (Syed Ahmed 
et al, Cechetti & Kharroubi etc..) make a point of substituting level-variables for growth-
variables. 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡−2
+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−2  + 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−2  
+ 𝛽15𝐼𝑁𝐹_𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐼𝑁𝐹_𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽17 𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽19𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Where  𝛽𝑛 are coefficients, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error-term and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents each dependent variable. The 
superscript 𝑖𝑡 denotes observations across individual countries over time. It is commonly 
assumed that the error-term is iid (individually and independently distributed) with a constant 
variance. However, this assumption is not innocuous. It is highly likely that the variance is not 
homogenous across observations, or heteroskedastic. Since it is difficult to identify the true 
structure of the variance we apply White-standard-errors. As revealed by figure 2 there are 
notable income disparities in the EU, even within the segments and as a result, it is likely that 
the heteroskedasticity springs from individual countries. Consequently, we apply the cross-
section version of White-standard-errors to control for heteroskedasticity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 This is tested formally below. 
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Estimating these equations would yield the short-run relationship between contemporary values 
of financial and economic development. As discussed initially, it is possible that short and -
long-run relationships differ. Indulging that suspicion, some researchers have chosen to model 
the long-run relationship between financial - and economic development through VEC-models. 
While a suitable option, particularly when dealing with non-stationary variables, the analysis is 
complicated when modelling cointegration between several variables (Hansson & Jonung, 
1997, p. 288). Fortunately, there exists a method that can be used to investigate long-run 
relationships without employing VECM. Pesaran (1997) has developed an extension of the 
Phillips-Hansen Procedure described as a “fully modified OLS procedure” (Pesaran, 1997, p. 
17) that approaches long run relationships not through cointegration but through evaluation of 
the sum of the lag coefficients extracted from the ARDL-model. By aggregating the effect of 
the same variable over time, the sum should correspond to the long-run effect. This approach 
has also been used by Ghildiyal et al to study financial and economic development in India. In 
a subsequent study, Pesaran, Shin & Smith (2001) introduce the concept of a long-run multiplier 
(Pesaran et al, 2001, p. 292). This technique is also referred to as the “bounds-testing technique” 
(Pesaran et al, 2001, p. 290). The general definition of the long-run multiplier is as follows: 
𝜃 =
𝛽
1 − 𝜙
 
Where 𝛽 represents the coefficient of any given explanatory variable, 𝜙 is the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable and 𝜃 is the LR-multiplier. If we assume stationarity (in differences) 
we can express the multiplier in terms of our model as the following equation: 
 
𝜃 =
Σ𝛽𝑡
1 − 𝜙
 
 
Where 𝛽𝑡 is the coefficient on each of the lags of any given explanatory variable. Substituting 
VEC for the multiplier does come at a price however since it does not exploit the 
“superconsistency” (Enders, 2015, p. 361) that comes with cointegration (see Pesaran p.7). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that since we estimate the ARDL-model in differences, the 
estimated long-run effects are on the growth rate rather than its level-variable or on the steady-
state growth rate rather than its equilibrium-level value. While qualitatively similar since an 
effect on a level variable should also carry over to the growth rate of the very same variable, 
this modification should be kept in mind when the results from this model are compared with 
those from the VEC-model. 
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5.2 Testing for Stationarity 
Before proceeding to dynamic specification and subsequent estimation, it is necessary to 
confirm whether our suspicion of the existence of unit roots can be confirmed. Several variables 
in the dataset, such as GDP per worker per hours worked, gross fixed capital formation or 
average years of schooling, can be assumed to display upwards trending behaviors. If variables 
are integrated of different orders any regressions based on them will give spurious and 
inconsistent results unfit for inference (Enders, 2015, p. 195). Furthermore, the ability to 
compute the long-run multiplier is contingent on the stationarity of the variables. To test for 
and ultimately control for such occurrences we apply unit-root tests for all variables. The results 
of said tests are presented in table 2, with the test statistics and level of significance reported, 
for the groups of developed and emerging countries respectively. 
 
Table 2 – Unit root tests 
 Level First difference 
Group Developed Emerging Developed Emerging 
GDP_AVGHR -2.52220*** 1.51619 -8.30154*** -7.65948*** 
TFPG -8.96982*** -8.11523*** -16.7542*** -13.5199*** 
K_EMPAVGH -1.75898** 0.17994 -7.52057*** -6.85985*** 
ROA -5.37117*** -2.82006*** -15.2893*** -9.14077*** 
ROE -4.94291*** -3.16435*** -13.8259*** -7.64653*** 
NIM -5.33876*** -3.71686*** -15.7026*** -13.8445*** 
DEP_TOT -7.23367*** -11.4552*** -2.08050*** -9.12391*** 
DEP_GDP 0.48733 -1.92725** -3.86768*** -1.62682* 
STOCK_TOT -7.16458*** -3.99500*** -8.62092*** -7.96423*** 
TURNOVER_RATIO -6.75699*** -6.60239*** -13.2547*** -15.0096*** 
SCHOOL 7.43183 -12.2146*** -17.4112*** -6.08748*** 
TRADE 1.04455 2.11035 -12.0176*** -7.95387*** 
INF_A -7.70919*** -13.6296*** -13.6749*** -8.62930*** 
Note: asterisks reflect the level of significance. ***, **, * is equivalent to significant results at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
The test statistic reported is from the Im, Pesaran and Shin test (IPS) which assumes cross-
section specific unit-root processes which are subsequently combined for an overall result for 
the entire panel. Additionally, tests were conducted using the Levin, Lin and Chu method (LLC) 
which differs from the IPS test in that it assumes a common unit-root process for the entire 
panel (Ferreira, 2013). Results of both tests where roughly similar. While the test statistics 
indicate that most variables are in fact stationary in levels there is reason to be suspicious of 
those results. An unavoidable property of panel unit-root tests is that the null can be rejected if 
the cross-sectional observation for just one of the countries is stationary (Verbeek, 2012, p 414). 
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As such there is a chance that nonstationary variables are mistakenly included, if the panel unit 
root tests are trusted too blindly, making inference and further testing more uncertain. To 
control for the possibility of non-stationarity we therefore estimate our models in first-
differences for those variables that does not show percentage changes, which in a sense already 
are first-differentiated. 
5.3 Dynamic Specification 
Economic variables often display varying degrees of sluggishness and it is therefore common 
to model variables as autoregressive functions and lagged explanatory variables. Hence, we 
introduce lags for all regressors, including the dependent variable. By including an AR-term, 
the complication arises that we need to ensure that the residuals at least approximate white noise 
(specifically to rule out autocorrelation). This is achieved by experimenting with different lag-
lengths for both the lagged dependent variable and the other explanatory variables. There is no 
silver bullet for identifying the true model specification but there exists a number of helpful 
rationales. A straightforward approach to begin with is to follow the so called “Box-Jenkins-
procedure” (Enders, 2015, p. 76) which advices to begin by inspecting the autocorrelation-
function and partial autocorrelation-functions (ACF and PACF respectively). The correlograms 
(see appendix) reveal upon inspection the standard pattern for the AR(1)-process with a 
geometrically decaying ACF and a PACF with a single spike at the first lag (less so for TFPG) 
(Enders, 2015, p. 66). For the independent variables we pursue the “general-to-specific” 
technique which means starting at relatively long lags and successively paring down the lags 
using significance tests (Enders ,2015, p. 290). Another common operation is to base lag-
lengths on 𝑇
1
3 (Phillips & Xiao, 1998, p. 37). Both techniques lead us to a specification of two 
or three lags for each explanatory variable (apart from the lagged dependent variable) and since 
both techniques are mere shorthand-measures, our final definitive specification will be decided 
with the help of information criteria. The information criteria consulted are the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) for each 
of the regressions estimated, as reported in table 3. We see that, with one exception, both criteria 
rule in favour of a two-lag specification for the explanatory variables for both segments. This 
conclusion is reinforced by noting that the outlier consists of a conflict between the AIC and 
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SBC in noting that the AIC is biased toward overparameterized models (Enders, 2015, p. 70) 
and that the SBC is more trustworthy as T exceeds 7.  
 
Table 3 – Panel regression information criteria 
 AIC SBC 
Dependent variable Developed Emerging Developed Emerging 
 2 lag 3 lag 2 lags 3 lags 2 lag 3 lag 2 lags 3 lags 
GDP_AVGHR 2.420 2.462 2.420 2.461 2.958 3.193 2.958 3.193 
K_AVGHR 1.674 1.632 0.984 1.038 2.217 2.370 1.621 1.934 
TFPG 3.565 3.593 4.784 4.793 4.102 4.324 5.421 5.688 
 
However, as Enders counsels, scepticism is always healthy (particularly in larger samples) and 
to ascertain that we can at least suspect to have removed any serial correlation we close by 
comparing Durbin-Watson-statistics for both specifications. Since the complete absence of 
autocorrelation is achieved with a DW-value of 2, the table below indicates roughly equal 
results for both models with a slight nod for the two-lag specification for the developed 
segment. For the emerging segment the values are indeterminate. Coupled with the fact that 
casual inspection of the residual series for the two-lag model appear to approximate white noise, 
the definitive specification includes two lags on each explanatory variable. 
 
Table 4 – Panel regression DW-statistics 
 2 lags 3 lags 
 Developed Emerging Developed Emerging 
GDP 1.961797 2.126007 2.057191 2.097312 
K 1.894661 2.101524 2.187649 1.917337 
TFPG 1.964740 2.052392 2.191104 2.077893 
5.4 Panel regression results 
The results of the final panel data regressions are presented in table 5. Coefficient values are 
reported along with standard errors in parenthesis for each of the included variables. The results 
are contrasted to those of other relevant research and the Granger-causality tests in section 5.6, 
who act as a kind of robustness check against which we compare the results from the panel-
regression.  
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Table 5 – Panel regression results 
 Developed Emerging 
Dependent variable GDP_AV
GHR 
K_AVGH
R 
TFPG GDP_AV
GHR 
K_AVGH
R 
TFPG 
C 4.135 
(3.584) 
4.998*** 
(1.839) 
8.155 
(6.738) 
0.618 
(0.888) 
-0.214 
(0.534) 
-1.916 
(3.256) 
Y (-1) 0.031 
(0.087) 
0.051 
(0.103) 
0.299*** 
(0.076) 
-0.020 
(0.093) 
0.039 
(0.112) 
-0.041 
(0.090) 
ROA (-1) -0.063 
(0.056) 
0.0912 
(0.061) 
-0.120 
(0.095) 
0.469*** 
(0.083) 
0.145* 
(0.074) 
1.778*** 
(0.322) 
ROA (-2) 0.005 
(0.050) 
-0.073* 
(0.042) 
0.069 
(0.101) 
0.029 
(0.038) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
0.101 
(0.155) 
ROE (-1) 0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.035** 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.156*** 
(0.032) 
ROE (-2) -0.004 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.036*** 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.045* 
(0.025) 
NIM (-1) -0.166* 
(0.090) 
-0.028 
(0.104) 
-0.304* 
(0.182) 
-0.233** 
(0.072) 
-0.079** 
(0.035) 
-0.732*** 
(0.262) 
NIM (-2) 0.030 
(0.120) 
0.083 
(0.085) 
0.221 
(0.207) 
-0.079 
(0.053) 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
-0.066 
(0.181) 
DEP_TOT (-1) 0.021 
(0.158) 
-0.192** 
(0.079) 
0.085 
(0.296) 
0.050 
(0.033) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
0.333** 
(0.152) 
DEP_TOT (-2) -0.042 
(0.139) 
0.151** 
(0.070) 
-0.146 
(0.264) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.214* 
(0.127) 
DEP_GDP (-1) -0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.016* 
(0.015) 
-0.138 
(0.098) 
DEP_GDP (-2) 0.007 
(0.009) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.069 
(0.092) 
STOCK_TOT (-1) -0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.049 
(0.107) 
STOCK_TOT (-2) 0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
0.061 
(0.085) 
TURNOVER_RAT
IO (-1) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
TURNOVER_RAT
IO (-2) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
INF_A (-1) -0.252*** 
(0.052) 
-0.082** 
(0.068) 
-0.681*** 
(0.121) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.102*** 
(0.026) 
INF_A (-2) 0.099* 
(0.058) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
0.172 
(0.124) 
0.054*** 
(0.011) 
0.017** 
(0.010) 
0.217*** 
(0.047) 
SCHOOL (-1) 0.300* 
(0.167) 
0.246* 
(0.087) 
0.658* 
(0.401) 
0.474*** 
(0.152) 
0.155* 
(0.089) 
1.945** 
(0.593) 
SCHOOL (-2) 0.119 
(0.335) 
0.174 
(0.162) 
0.277 
(0.598) 
0.593* 
(0.327) 
0.191 
(0.163) 
1.996** 
(1.200) 
TRADE (-1) -0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.035* 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.042) 
TRADE (-2) 0.002 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
-0.017* 
(0.011) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.050 
(0.042) 
R-squared 0.336 0.275 0.448 0.157 0.201 0.362 
Note: asterisks reflect the level of significance. ***, **, * is equivalent to significant results at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
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Starting with those measures of financial development that turned out to Granger-cause 
economic growth, the first result that announces itself is the ROE. Achieving convincing results 
from the Granger-tests in table 7, the results for both lags are robust for TFPG, significant only 
for the first lag on GDP_AVGHR and not significant whatsoever for capital accumulation in 
table 5. The signs of the coefficients are largely consistent with theory with a one-percent 
increase in the return on equity of the banking sector one year prior indicates a 0.24 percent-
increase in the growth of GDP_AVGHR and a 0.04 percent increase in the growth of total factor 
productivity. Somewhat surprising is the negative sign of the coefficient on the two-period lag 
in the TPFG-regression (although non-significant, the pattern extends to the same lag in the 
GDP-regression), which would suggest a time-variant response of both TFPG and 
GDP_AVGHR to ROE.  
 
These results appear to somewhat vindicate Candida Ferreira’s inclusion of the return on equity 
of the banking system. Since significant results are obtained irrespective of both deflations of 
GDP (per capita or hours) and for TFPG, ROE can safely be said to have an effect on the growth 
of labor productivity. Less conclusive are the magnitudes of the coefficients. Ferreira’s result 
for the first lag of ROE indicates a larger effect on GDP_AVGHR (0.071>0.024) than our 
estimation. The results for both studies indicate that there may be reason to doubt the 
explanatory power of the second lag of ROE for GDP_AVGHR since our results determine it 
to be non-significant and her results only achieve significance at the 10-percent level. The 
coefficient values for the second lag are comparably marginal at -0.004 for us and 0.013 for 
Ferreira. Although the relevance of the second lags is questionable, they share with the first 
lags the tendency to overestimate the effect of the ROE. A possible explanation is that in 
neglecting to include other measures of financial development, the ROE assumes the effect of 
those omitted measures, in which case our initial guess would prove correct. 
 
However, the most prominent divergence with Ferreira’s results arises in the specification of 
the appropriate causal mechanism. Ferreira only allows for the link between financial 
development and economic development to be channeled through growth in the gross fixed 
capital formation. That approach only allows her to attain significance at the 10-percent level 
for the first lag, albeit with a greater effect than for GDP (0.11) while our results resoundingly 
reject ROE as a determinant of the rate of capital accumulation per hour. Rather, our robust 
results for TFPG indicate that the effect of ROE is channeled through the growth in total factor 
productivity. A surprising result is obtained when evaluating the effect of the ROE for the 
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emerging segment. Contrary to Ferreira’s findings, the ROE is robustly negative for the first 
lag of GDP_AVGHR and TFPG although the non-significant effect on K_AVGHR is consistent 
with the developed segment and, thus, inconsistent with Ferreira’s results. Notable is that the 
effect is at least as strong as for the developed segment but in the opposite direction, with a 
substantial negative effect on the TFPG.  
 
If the inclusion of the ROE was deemed relevant, the inclusion of Ferreira’s other measure of 
financial development, bank return on assets, is less convincing for the developed segment. In 
fact, the Granger-tests appear to hint at reverse causality between economic growth and ROA, 
at least at the second lag. Reverse causality gains support from the panel-regression which 
returns a weakly significant result only for the effect of ROA on K_AVGHR, also at the second 
lag. The unequivocality with which we deny the effects of ROA on any measure of economic 
development for the developed segment is puzzling when compared to Ferreira’s results, 
particularly since her sample is essentially identical to ours. Although not significant for the 
growth of the gross fixed capital formation, both of her results for the first lags of ROA in both 
regressions are overwhelmingly positive (0.82 for GDP and 1.05 for capital). The judgment is 
altered when considering the results for the emerging segment. Here we obtain results that are 
closer to Ferreira’s. For the first lag of ROA, the coefficients are robust for all three equations 
with quite sizable coefficients. Indeed, given the coefficient value of 1.778 for TFPG, which is 
closer to Ferreira’s estimate for the growth of the effect of ROA on the growth of the capital 
stock, there is cause to believe that her results were colored by the effects of aggregating the 
entire EU in one sample. This line of argument is corroborated further when considering the 
robust results for both K_AVGHR and GDP_AVGHR as well as the sizable coefficients who 
report notably values larger than their developed segment equivalents.  
 
Less robust (at least in terms of Granger-causality) is the effect of the turnover-ratio on 
economic growth. For this variable, we encounter the first contradiction between the Granger-
test and the panel-regression. While the Granger-test returned significant results on the 10%, 
5% and 1% -levels for the first lag and the first two levels for the second lag, the panel 
regression only achieves a marginal 10% - significance for the second lag in the TFPG-
regression. The marginality extends to the value of the coefficient which indicates that a 0.008 
percent increase in TPFG correlates with a 1-percent increase in the turnover-ratio. The 
marginal response is unsurprising since theory predicted this variable to have a larger effect for 
the emerging segment. Instead, the countries in the developed segment were predicted to have 
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a closer relationship with the value-traded-ratio. In analyzing STOCK_TOT, the first bi-
directional result is obtained. Bi-directional Granger-causality is significant at all levels for the 
first lag and for the 10 and 5-percent levels for the second lag. The panel-regression is more 
hard-pressed to find a significant effect of STOCK_TOT. Only at the 10-percent level are the 
first lags of STOCK_TOT significant for GDP_AVGHR and K_AVGHR, respectively. 
Combined with the marginal results of -0.007 for GDP_AVGHR and -0.004 for K_AVGHR 
and the negativity of the coefficients, this result appears highly questionable. The results for the 
stock-market variables have even less bearing on the emerging segment, where no coefficients 
are found significant at any level for any of the dependent variables and across time.  
 
The results for the stock-market variables gain wider significance when contrasted with the 
results of Levine & Zervos. Strikingly, their study achieves robust results for the relation 
between the turnover-ratio and all three dependent variables and returns significantly larger 
coefficients (between 0.02 and 0.027). Explaining the disparity between the results obtained 
and Levine’s results are all but straightforward, however some leading candidates emerge. 
Levine & Zervos consider a sample with countries of varying income levels but since our results 
are reproduced almost identically for the emerging segment income seems to be 
inconsequential. A more compelling explanation would concern Levine & Zervos’ use of 
contemporary variables as opposed to their lagged realizations. Levine & Zervos do not 
estimate a separate VAR-model to investigate causality but since they are able to prove 
causality running from the turnover-ratio to all measures of economic development and our 
results, with some exceptions, corroborate this, simultaneity appear unable to account for the 
disparity. It is possible, thus, that the effect has no persistence and vanishes almost completely 
after one period, which would explain the difference in results.  
 
The pattern for the second stock-market variable, the value-traded ratio, is carried over from 
that of the turnover-ratio but with even greater discrepancies. While our results for 
STOCK_TOT are roughly equal to those for TURNOVER_RATIO, Levine & Zervos’ results 
are significant at all conventional levels for all three dependents. Their coefficients range from 
0.075 for productivity growth, 0.093 for the growth of the capital stock per capita and 0.098 for 
RGDP per capita which are substantially larger than those reported in the table above. The 
disparities could obviously be resolved by the same explanations offered for the turnover-ratio. 
Analogous to the interpretation of Ferreira’s results, the size of Levine & Zervos’ coefficients 
for both variables may be chalked up to their assuming the effects of other intermediary 
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variables not included in their equations. This explanation is less satisfactory in this case, 
however, since apart from an extensive array of control variables, they also include one measure 
of credit allocation. Nonetheless, the implications of omitted variables ought to be responsible 
for some of the disparities.  
 
As for the credit-measures, the Granger-tests only find support for uni-directional causality 
running from credit to economic development in the effect running from deposit money bank 
assets to capital/hours per worker (at the 5-percent level). GDP_AVGHR, on the other hand, 
show tendencies of reverse or bi-directional Granger-causality for both DEP_TOT and 
domestic private credit to GDP. DEP_TOT is Granger-caused by GDP_AVHR at the 10-
percent level. However, for K_AVGHR, DEP_TOT displays uni-directional causality at the 1-
percent level. Interestingly, inspection of the panel-regression shows support for the Granger-
test for DEP_TOT on capital accumulation in returning significant results at the 5-percent level 
for both lags. Turning to the coefficients, note that they partially depart from theory as the first 
lag shows a negative impact of 0.192 while the second is consistent with theory with a positive 
impact of 0.151. Indeed, Levine & King, employing only contemporary variables, record a 
significantly lower value for their regression of the growth of capital per capita on deposit 
money bank assets (0.022). The size of the coefficients, coupled with significance at the 5-
percent level indicate that the predominant effect of the growth in deposit money bank assets is 
on the rate of capital accumulation. Similarly, DEP_GDP is only significant for K_AVGHR 
and is negative and positive for the first and second lag respectively. Conclusions about the 
impact of the growth of private domestic credit on the growth of the capital stock/hours per 
worker should only be drawn with caution, however, given the modest coefficients and the bi-
directional Granger results.  
 
Interestingly, despite the fact that both credit variables were incorporated in this study on the 
suggestion of Levine & King among others, our results are far more ambiguous than theirs. In 
fact, similar to the comparisons with Levine & Zervos for the stock-market variables, Levine 
& King obtain highly robust results for the growth rates of both deposit money bank assets and 
private domestic credit to GDP on the growth rates of RGDP per capita, capital stock per capita 
and the residual (see theoretical model section 3.2), while we produce similar results only for 
K_AVGHR for the developed segment, and TFPG for the emerging segment (only DEP_TOT). 
In contrast with earlier results our estimates for DEP_TOT for the developed segment actually 
far exceed those of Levine & King in absolute value for both lags (0.192>0.022 for the first and 
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0.152>0.022 for the second). The same is not true for the effect of DEP_GDP on capital 
accumulation where the coefficient for the same variable on the growth of the capital stock per 
capita is slightly larger.  
 
Our results suggest that, in some fashion, there exists an income-based response of both deposit 
money bank assets and private credit, however, not only in the form expected initially. Upon 
inspection of the emerging segment, the only significant results for DEP_TOT are found for 
TFPG, where the first lag is significant at the 5-percent level and the second at the 10-percent 
level. Although the signs are reversed from the regression of K_AVGHR on DEP_TOT, the 
relative magnitudes are greater for the emerging segment. For DEP_GDP, the effect appears 
slightly weaker for the emerging segment than for the developed since significance is attained 
only at the first lags for K_AVGHR and TFPG and then merely at the 5-percent level for TFPG 
and the 10-percent level for K_AVGHR. The sign on the coefficients both defy theory in 
indicating negative effects on both TFPG and K_AVGHR, but DEP_GDP has a more 
pronounced negative effect than for the developed segment on the first lag, while the reverse is 
true for the effect on K_AVGHR. It would appear that at least for the credit variables (in 
particular for DEP_TOT) the choice to fracture the sample in two segments was appropriate. 
While the dynamic effects are roughly equal for both segments, the effects are greater (both 
negative and positive) for the emerging segment. The implications for the theory of an income-
based response of financial on economic development cannot be discerned without the results 
from the long-run model since the contradictory results suggest a time-varying effect, but the 
short-run results do suggest a more vehement effect with lower income. Furthermore, the 
absence of fracturing would also have failed to pick up on how the growth of credit has varying 
degrees of importance for different aspects of economic development. Surprisingly, even 
though both variables clearly have some effect on the mechanisms of GDP-growth posited by 
Levine & King and Levine (1997), none of the segments return significant results for 
GDP_AVGHR. It is unlikely that this discrepancy with Levine & King would be explained 
solely by the use of hours instead of capita to deflate GDP-growth, thus this could hint at a 
breakdown of the causal links between capital accumulation and total factor productivity 
growth. 
 
Levine & King are not alone in relating distinct measures of credit to GDP-growth. As 
mentioned in the literature review, Cecchetti & Kharroubi, De Gregorio & Guidotti and Ahmed 
et al use private credit to GDP, Demetriades & Hussein, Mirdala and Ghildiyal et al use 
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measures comparable with DEP_TOT. The results of Demetriades & Hussein, Mirdala and 
Ghildiyal et al will be discussed in relation to the long-run results. A common detraction from 
these studies is that they make no attempts to identify causal mechanisms and opt instead for 
only studying the effects on different definitions of GDP-growth. Starting with Cecchetti & 
Kharroubi, it is important to note that since they do not difference their credit-variable and use 
five-year averages, a complete comparison is difficult. Their results are divided into separate 
presentations for each of the six five-year periods in their sample but the coefficients do not 
vary significantly and range between 0.035-0.038 for the first five periods and 0.048 for the 
final period (Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012, p. 5). As was the case for the comparison with 
Levine & King, Cecchetti & Kharroubi find a robust relationship between private credit and 
GDP-growth, while we are unable to find any such relationship, and even if we could, their 
estimates of the effects are greater than ours. Indeed, the relevance of their results are somewhat 
magnified since Cecchetti & Kharroubi use the same definition of GDP-growth.  
 
Although they find significant results for private credit to GDP and measure it in levels, De 
Gregorio & Guidotti’s results for high-income countries align more with our results. Since their 
observations are made up of five-year averages they organize their results like Cecchetti & 
Kharroubi and thus report results for each period. Their estimates range from -0.005 to 0.024 
(De Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995, p. 439) which is closer to our results than any reported above. 
The similarities are not projected onto the results for their low and middle-income segment, 
however, where their significant estimates range from 0.044 to 0.135. Note that this comparison 
abides by the same caveat as for Cecchetti & Kharroubi since they use levels of private credit 
to GDP averaged over five years. This caveat makes tracing the origins of the diverging results 
difficult, but one explanation relates to the prospect of non-stationarity. Our IPS-results 
indicated the existence of a unit root in the coefficient for the level variable of DEP_GDP but 
neither De Gregorio & Guidotti nor Cecchetti & Kharroubi report making any adjustments to 
accommodate this possibility. While their R-squared values do not indicate spurious 
regressions, this is indeed worth mentioning.  
 
If the absence of differenced variables and use of five-year averages made the above 
comparison difficult, comparison with Ahmed et al should be made all the easier. While, as 
mentioned they only run regressions with GDP-measures as independent variables, they do 
include the growth of the per capita capital stock as an independent variable. For the regression 
of the growth of RGPD per capita, their estimate of -0.0004 is much lower than our results for 
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both segments and similarity is compounded by their inability to achieve significant results for 
any level but at the 10-percent level. Another interesting result emerges if the comparison is 
made between the results of the regression of K_AVGHR onto DEP_GDP and the estimate of 
Ahmed et al for the effect of growth of the per capita capital stock on the growth of RGDP per 
capita. Their estimate is a meager 0.005 obtained on the 10-percent significance level. Since 
their study is case-oriented, the generalizability of their results may be questionable, 
nonetheless, they may be used together with other results in questioning the mechanisms posited 
by Levine, at least in the short run. 
 
Another interesting result is the effect of the net interest margin. While the Granger-tests 
categorically fail to confirm causality running in either direction for any of the variables, the 
panel regression obtains slightly different, albeit weak, results. Only at the first lag is 
significance obtained and then merely at the 10-percent level. The signs on the coefficients for 
the first lag conform to theory and the effects are indeed non-negligible for all three equations. 
Nonetheless, the net interest margin does not seem to wield noteworthy effect on economic 
development for the developed segment. However, the NIM does seem to exert influence on 
economic development for the emerging segment. For the first lag, the NIM is significant at the 
5-percent level for both TPFG and GDP_AVGHR and at the 10-percent level for K_AVGHR. 
The effect seems to subside after two periods since none of the second lags are significant for 
either segment. The coefficients display the expected negativity as well as fulfilling the 
expectation that the effect is larger for the emerging than for the developed segment.   
 
Our choice of control-variables appears slightly misguided, at least for the developed segment. 
While the first lag of average inflation is highly robust, the results for both trade and schooling 
are unconvincing. Schooling is significant at the ten-percent level only on the first lag for all 
equations while it achieves the same result for TPFG but for both lags. For the emerging 
segment inflation at both lags appears appropriate but the expectation of negative effects is only 
validated for the first lags of all dependents, while reversing for second lags.  
 
The interpretation of the results for the developed segment is concluded by observing the 
adjusted R-squared-values. Table 7 reveals that TFPG is explained to the greatest extent 
explained by the measures of financial development and control variables at 53.1% with 
GDP_AVGHR at 43.5% and K_AVGHR at 38.5%.  
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5.4.1 Summary 
With some exceptions, a clearly discernible pattern is that of the relative under-estimation of 
the relationships between several of the independent and dependent variables. Particularly for 
the stock-market measures but at a lesser extent also for the credit measures does this pattern 
ring true. Surprisingly, given the findings of Levine & Zervos, the short-run effect of the stock-
market variables can with some confidence be entirely written off for both segments. In terms 
of the credit variables, a notable result is that for neither segment is any of the variables 
significantly related to the growth in RGDP/hour. The effect of the credit variables appears 
instead to be linked to the growth of total factor productivity for the emerging segment and the 
growth of the capital stock for the developed segment but with different signs on the coefficients 
across periods.  
 
The most robust results are found for the measures of bank efficiency but with a decided 
contrast between the developed and emerging segments. While the return on assets appears 
inconsequential for the developed segment, it is highly relevant for the emerging segment, even 
more so in fact, than for Ferreira’s sample. The effects of the return on equity are more evenly 
balanced across the segments but the negative effect for the emerging segment defies the 
predictions of theory. In contrast with Ferreira’s results, we do not find much support for the 
effect of the ROE on the growth of the capital stock.  
The importance of income is extended to the final measure of financial system efficiency, the 
net interest margin. While the developed segment records an effect for the first lag of TFPG, 
the emerging segments show effects for the first lags of NIM in all three equations. Finally, the 
coefficients indicate a larger impact for the emerging segment. 
5.5 Long-run effects 
The long-run effects of the independent variables onto the dependent ones, estimated as 
described in section 5.1, are presented in table 6. The long-run impact is measured separately 
for each variable. The test reveals several interesting results, notably there appears to be more 
variables that have a significant impact for the group of emerging countries than for the 
developed one. Of interest is also that the sign of several variables in many cases is negative 
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which often contradicts what would be expected. This is shared amongst both groups, 
suggesting that some aspects of financial development have a negative impact on economic 
growth in the long run. 
 
Table 6 – Long-run effects 
 Developed Emerging 
 GDP K TFPG GDP K TFPG 
ROA -0.060 0.020 -0.073 0.489*** 0.144* 1.805*** 
ROE 0.021* 0.009 0.006 -0.042*** -0.017** -0.193*** 
NIM -0.140 0.058 -0.119 -0.305*** -0.104** -0.767** 
DEP_TOT -0.022 -0.043** -0.087 0.035*** 0.017** 0.115*** 
DEP_GDP -0.003 -0.006** -0.011* -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.066*** 
STOCK_TOT -0.003 -0.004* -0.014 0.010 0.009 0.011 
TURNOVER_RATIO 0.001 0.002 0.011* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Note: asterisks reflect the level of significance. ***, **, * is equivalent to significant results at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. 
5.5.1 Developed countries 
The long run effects of all variables on GDP per hours worked is negative except for two, return 
on equity and turnover ratio. Return on equity is also the only variables that have a significant 
impact. While return on equity is significant also in the short run there seems to be no long-run 
effects carried over from NIM and STOCK_TOT. Only the variables DEP_TOT and 
DEP_GDP, that both have negative signs, have any significant impacts on capital formation per 
hours worked. The difference from the short-run results is that NIM and STOCK_TOT have no 
long-run impact and that the long run effects from the credit variables are negative. DEP_GDP 
and TURNOVER_RATIO are the variables that have significant impacts on total factor 
productivity growth in the long run. For the stock-market variables, the transition from short to 
long run produce no notable changes, although the weak significance for GDP_AVGHR on the 
first lag of STOCK_TOT disappears to be replaced by the same effect for K_AVGHR. The 
marginally significant second lag for TFPG on the TURNOVER_RATIO seem valid even in 
the long run but with the similarly meager effect. This result stands out as the only stock-market 
variable that aligns with the positive effect foretold by theory. More engaging is the long-run 
results of the credit measures. The ambiguous dynamic effects of both DEP_TOT and 
DEP_GDP encountered in the short-run are substituted for unanimously negative results with 
DEP_TOT maintaining its dominance of DEP_GDP.  
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These results for the bank variables are, as mentioned, remarkably different from that of 
previous research. Ferreira finds significant and strictly positive effects for ROA and ROE on 
both the growth of GDP per capita and capital formation per capita. Remarkable is also how 
the effect of the ROE seems to abate over time since the coefficients for all three equations 
shrink in the transition from short to long run and only for GDP_AVGHR is it significant (and 
marginally at that). The irrelevance of the ROA for the developed segment translates almost 
seamlessly from the short to the long-run and is, in fact, reinforced in the long run by the failure 
of the second lag to have any lasting impact. For the NIM, the short-run effects are reflected 
largely in their long-run counterparts except for the fact that the already tenuous effect on TFPG 
breaks down in the long run.  
5.5.2 Emerging countries 
For the group of emerging countries all variables but the ones related to stock market activity 
have significant long-run effects on GDP per hours worked. This differs from the results in 
short run where some of the credit-variables are insignificant. As is the case in the short-run 
several of the variables, ROE and DEP_GDP, somewhat surprisingly have negative impacts on 
economic development. The results are similar when measuring the long run effects on the 
growth of capital accumulation and total factor productivity. Overall, the coefficients mostly 
share the same sign as in the short run. 
 
The results for the long-run effect of the stock market variables are interesting as they have no 
significant impact whatsoever. As in the case of the developed countries this result goes against 
the findings by Levine & Zervos and is perhaps more intriguing as one might expect financial 
development to have a more pronounced impact on less developed countries. The results are 
also starkly different from those obtained by Ghildiyal et al for India, where they find a highly 
significant and positive relationship between market capitalization and GDP growth per capita. 
As is the case in the paper by Ferreira both ROA and ROE have significant impacts on all the 
dependent variables. For both variables, the short-run effects are upheld even in the long run 
where, for the ROA, some of the coefficients even improve on their short-run performance.  
 
The long-run effect of the NIM is even stronger than those for the first lag which is surprising 
since the lack of significant results on the second lag may be taken as a sign of a diminishing 
effect over time.    
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The coefficient for DEP_GDP is negative and highly significant, improving on its short-run 
performance but maintaining the negativity. These results are contrary to those of De Gregorio 
& Guidotti and Cecchetti & Kharroubi who in different panel data studies finds that credit as a 
share of GDP has a positive effect on GDP growth per capita. The contrasting results are even 
more apparent as De Gregorio and Guidotti show the effect to be highest in countries with low- 
or mid-level income, which should correspond to our group of emerging countries. The results 
also differ from those of Ghildiyal et al who find positive but insignificant effects from credit 
as a share of GDP onto GDP per capita. Our results are surprising and hard to explain but the 
sample used in the other studies includes countries with lower income levels than those of the 
emerging countries in Europe which makes it possible that the effects are diluted in comparison 
to ours. The other credit variable on the other hand, DEP_TOT, gives results that are consistent 
with those obtained in earlier research. Coefficients for the long-run effect on all dependent 
variables are both positive and highly significant, as also obtained by Levine & King.  
 
The credit measures in the emerging segment delivers even starker contrasts between long and 
short run than for the developed segment. While the short-run regressions are unable to confirm 
robust relationships between any of the credit variables and any of the dependent variables other 
than TFPG, the long-run estimates are robust for both variables on all three dependents. As for 
the developed segment, the time-variant effects are erased in the long run but in contrast with 
the short run, they turn out positive instead of negative. Compared to the first lags of DEP_TOT, 
the long-run effects are smaller than the non-significant results on K_AVGHR and 
GDP_AVGHR and the significant TPFG which would indicate an abating effect over time. The 
effect of DEP_GDP is still negative in the long run but with slightly diminished effects. 
5.5.2 Summary 
The major takeaway from the long-run equations is the tendency of significant relationships, 
principally for the emerging segment, to be achieved where none were found in the short run. 
Where the short-run relationship between both credit measures only showed signs of significant 
impact for TFPG, the long-run multiplier offered significant results for K_AVGHR and 
GDP_AVGHR. The same pattern recurs, albeit with lesser heft, for the ROE where all three 
dependents are significantly affected. The stock-market variables are roughly as 
inconsequential to any measures of economic development as was found the short-run. The 
analysis of the emerging segment also helps to throw into contention the idea of a breakdown 
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in how the rate of capital accumulation and total factor productivity growth feed into GDP-
growth. It would appear that, at least, for the emerging segment, the mechanisms feed into GDP-
growth cumulatively over time. That this effect is not found for the developed segment may 
indicate that the posited collapse of the positive impact of financial development on economic 
development, indeed, has something going for it. 
5.6 Testing for Granger causality 
Given the contradictory results of empirical studies of whether financial development causes 
economic growth, as theory suggests, we are interested in finding out the causal relationship 
between our dependent and independent variables. In order to examine this, we conduct 
Granger causality tests. The test determines if the past observations of one variable help to 
explain, or improves the explanation, of another variable’s future performance and vice versa 
(Enders, 2015, p 305-306). To conduct these tests, we convert our panel-data model to a Panel-
VAR specification. The nature of VAR-model necessitates that the set of explanatory variables 
contain no contemporary values. The test is run for each of the dependent variables against the 
complete set of independent ones, where all variables are corrected for non-stationarity when 
necessary. Stationarity is a crucial property as the test is nonstandard and unusable otherwise 
(Enders, 2015, p 309). With the null hypothesis being that the variable in question does not 
Granger-cause the corresponding variable a significant result is taken as an indication that there 
is a Granger-causal relationship. 
 
Granger causality tests are conducted for the different lag lengths of all dependent variables 
showing the Granger-causal relationship to the independent ones, and vice versa. The results in 
terms of level of significance for GDP_AVGHR as dependent variable are presented in table 5 
and 6. Results of testing the other dependent variables are merely discussed. 
 
The results of our estimations, at least in part, differ from those of previous research. Ferreira 
finds strong evidence for bidirectional Granger causality when examining the link between 
GDP growth, capital formation and bank efficiency in Europe for the period 1996-2008 which 
our results, at least in part, contradict. King and Levine (1993) on the other hand, albeit not by 
computing Granger-causality tests, find that credit variables similar to ours helps explaining the 
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growth of GDP per capita, capital per capita and total factor productivity growth for the earlier 
period 1960-1989. Our results again show less synonymous results. 
5.6.1 High Income-group 
The results of the Granger test for the high-income group reveals that few combinations display 
the behavior that would suggest a Granger causal relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. As is shown in table 5 only ROE can be said to Granger-cause 
GDP_AVGHR for both lags while no link is apparent for ROA. However, for capital formation 
the bidirectional relationship between the two lags of both bank efficiency variables. As for 
TFPG there is a unidirectional link with lag one of ROA and a bidirectional link for lag 2. There 
is a unidirectional link between TFPG and ROE for both lags. Lastly, net interest margin is a 
curious case amongst the efficiency variables as it has no apparent Granger causal link with any 
of the dependent variables. The results for ROA and ROE are very different from those reported 
by Ferreira. A plausible reason is the difference in the samples that are tested. While that study 
as well as this one uses panel data and regards Europe over the past couple of decades there is 
one potentially important distinction. While Ferreira considers the EU as a whole we have, as 
described, divided the sample into two groups of emerging and developed countries which 
could skew the results. 
 
As for the variables that reflect the credit market there is a weak reverse relationship between 
GDP_AVGHR and DEP_TOT for lag 1. There is a unidirectional link with capital growth per 
capita and DEP_TOT for lag 2 and bidirectional one with DEP_GDP for both lags. Between 
TFPG and the credit variables there is solely a reverse relationship with DEP_GDP for lag 2. 
The results are, as mentioned, much less convincing than those presented by King and Levine 
who find strong relationships between measures for credit and the various variables for 
economic growth. Our estimations instead lean towards the results by Cecchetti & Kharroubi 
who find that financial development has a diminishing effect on economic growth, which could 
explain the relative lack of significant causal relationships. 
STOCK_TOT has a bidirectional link with all three dependent variables for both lags. The last 
dependent variable, TURNOVER_RATIO, has a unidirectional link with GDP_AVGHR for 
both lags, a unidirectional one with K_AVGHR for lag one and a bidirectional link with TFPG 
for lag 2. The results somewhat support those of Levine who find strong evidence that similar 
stock market measures contribute to the growth of all three dependent variables whereas we 
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find more sprawling results. The possible explanation that once again comes to mind is the 
diminishing benefit of financial development, which could result in more uncertain results. 
 
Table 7 – Granger causality tests for developed countries 
Dependent 
variable 
Causality Explanatory variable 1 lag 2 lags 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP_AVGHR 
 
 ROA 0.2941 0.1941 
  0.6434 0.2881 
 ROE 0.0057*** 0.0023*** 
  0.8126 0.7208 
 NIM 0.1380 0.2342 
  0.9767 0.6082 
 DEP_TOT 0.4596 0.7408 
  0.0532* 0.4772 
 DEP_GDP 0.3877 0.7092 
  0.4387 0.0144** 
 STOCK_TOT 0.0193** 0.0451** 
  0.0009*** 0.0106** 
 TURNOVER_RATIO 0.0041*** 0.0312** 
  0.5057 0.2783 
Note: asterisks reflect the level of significance. ***, **, * is equivalent to significant results at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. The arrows denote in which direction the causality is running. 
5.6.2 Emerging 
Testing for granger-causality in the group of emerging countries reveal the same, relative, lack 
of causal relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Neither ROA or ROE 
Granger causes GDP_AVGHR. Instead they are both part of reverse relationships for both lags. 
For capital accumulation ROA and ROE are part of reverse relationships for both lags. TFPG 
has a bidirectional link with ROE for lag 2 but none whatsoever with ROA. NIM is again a 
difficult one as it only has a reverse granger causal link with GDP_AVGHR. DEP_TOT has a 
reverse relationship with GDP per worker for lag one while DEP_GDP is part of a bidirectional 
one for both lags. The same link between DEP_GDP and K_AVGHR is true for both lags while 
there is none with DEP_TOT. TFPG only has a bidirectional link with DEP_GDP for lag 2. 
Curiously none of the stock market variables has any Granger causal link whatsoever with any 
of the dependent variables for the group of emerging countries, clearly contradicting the results 
by Levine (1997). 
 
The results from the group of emerging countries puts the possible explanation for the lack of 
solid evidence of Granger-causality for the previous group of countries somewhat to shame, as 
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its only at a stretch that the link between financial development and economic growth can be 
said to be stronger. However, as presented by Ahmed et al (2008) this is not the first time that 
the granger causal relationship between financial development and growth is unclear also for 
countries with less developed financial markets. They offer the possible explanation that the 
expansion of financial markets benefits less efficient investment and speculation rather than 
promotes economic growth. The bidirectional results for the variable DEP_GDP, which stand 
out amongst the other variables, are somewhat supported by the results found by Mirdala. When 
studying emerging countries in Europe individually they find Granger causal relationship 
between credit as a share of GDP and GDP growth for some of the countries examined. A 
possible explanation as to the unsatisfying results could be that while the emerging economies 
have less developed financial markets in comparison to their European neighbors  it is also a 
possibility that they still are refined enough to the point that they miss out of the benefits of an 
improved financial sector, as described in the previous section. 
 
Table 8 – Granger causality tests for emerging countries 
Dependent 
variable 
Causality Explanatory variable 1 lag 2 lags 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP_AVGHR 
 ROA 0.7238 0.7882 
  0.0154** 0.0152** 
 ROE 0.7049 0.7782 
  0.0285** 0.0375** 
 NIM 0.7838 0.1116 
  0.9143 0.0312** 
 DEP_TOT 0.6935 0.2952 
  0.0034*** 0.1237 
 DEP_GDP 0.0153** 0.0207** 
  0.0010*** 2.E-05*** 
 STOCK_TOT 0.1802 0.2549 
  0.3517 0.8220 
 TURNOVER_RATIO 0.3698 0.4201 
  0.9581 0.3543 
Note: asterisks reflect the level of significance. ***, **, * is equivalent to significant results at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level. The arrows denote in which direction the causality is running 
  46 
6 Conclusion 
In concluding our study, a fruitful start is to reconsider the questions posed at the outset. The 
first question was formulated as: Does financial development cause economic development? 
This question is answered by noting how causality is mediated by income. As hinted at by 
several researchers, income does exert impact on causal relationships. Both long and short-run 
estimations indicate that both the growth of credit allocation and measures of the quality (or 
efficiency) of the financial system have effects that are larger for the emerging segment. In 
contrast to findings that indicate that stock-market measures have an effect on economic 
development, we are not able to verify this claim for any of the segments. The Granger 
causality-tests indicate that those studies that deny the long-run causality between financial 
development (Hansson & Jonung and Demetriades & Hussein) may draw their conclusions 
somewhat prematurely even for the developed segment. Uni-directional causality is confirmed 
for the effect of the return on asset on the growth of RGDP per hours worked and TFPG while 
other variables have, at least, bi-directional causality. Interestingly, in light of theory and our 
panel-results, the picture is more muddled for the emerging segment but once again causality 
is not completely denied for financial development on economic development, which agrees 
with the results of Mirdala. It appears that we are served particularly well by fracturing the 
financial development into several measures, since otherwise chance might have lead us to 
concur with the skeptics. Nonetheless, our findings allow us to answer yes to the question if 
financial development causes economic development but, as always, with some qualifications. 
 
We are now in a position to answer our second question, which reads as follows: How does 
financial development cause economic development? Again, this answer is contingent on 
income but also on the distinction between long and short run. The developed segment shows 
lesser signs of a dichotomy between long and short run, however, and for this segment appears 
the puzzling result that for variables whose effects on the growth of capital accumulation and 
TFP, are not significant for the growth of RGDP per hour. That this result would indicate that 
capital accumulation and TFG are inconsequential to the growth of RGDP per hour and GDP 
in general is far from obvious, however. It is more likely that the failure to obtain robust results 
for GDP owes to flaws in our study.  
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The conclusion is more interesting for the emerging segment. As we have seen there is a notable 
difference between the short and long run that did not emerge for the developing segment. 
Where the link between technological innovation and capital accumulation with RGDP/hours 
appeared severed in the short-run, it was re-established in the long run. Furthermore, in the 
short run financial development appears only to feed into the growth of total factor productivity, 
while its effect on capital accumulation was found only in the long run. Those financial 
measures that were found weakly significant in the short run improved on their performance 
when in the long run (credit measures and efficiency measures), albeit with diminished 
coefficient values. Thus, while we find support for the mechanisms proposed by Levine & King 
, Levine  and Levine & Zervos, our findings also indicate that they were remiss in specifying 
under which circumstances they are expected to be valid. Without fracturing the sample into 
income-based segment or computing both short and long-run estimates, these results would 
remain obscured, suggesting a need for further refinement in further research.  
 
The findings of an income-based response to financial development raises interesting questions 
on the nature of this response. While De Gregorio & Guidotti and Jonung & Hansson suggest 
only a diminishing effect, Cecchetti & Kharroubi’s theory instead emphasize a negative 
relationship. Since, with some exceptions, we find that the effects of financial development are 
larger for the emerging segment the diminishing effect is supported. However, Cecchetti & 
Kharroubi’s U-turned relationship between economic and financial development is also 
discernible, particularly, for the growth of the credit-variables. While our study is not fully 
equipped to evaluate their theory, these findings hint at the need for wider application.  
 
Finally, as always, the appraisal of any study should take into account its limitations. While the 
study benefits from the ability to compare a wide range of variables through the use of a single 
sample, limited data availability for some variables forces us to limit the time-span considered. 
This pragmatism compromises slightly the comparison with those studies that engage with a 
dataset that ranges over longer time-periods. This problem is a lesser concern for the 
comparison with the panel-studies since they employ samples closer to ours, but more so for 
the VEC-studies. Comparison with the VEC-models also involve juxtaposing levels with 
growth-rates which may serve as a further cause of reservation. Another caveat concerns the 
potential inadequacies of fracturing the EU based on income treated in section 3.2.1. While the 
study appeared to vindicate the ETE as a proxy for low-income countries, it is not beyond doubt 
that the effects for the emerging segment are due to other aspects than income. As noted earlier, 
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the transition from centrally planned to market economy implies that, initially, these countries 
would have a relatively underdeveloped financial system which may have an impact 
independent of income. This possibility cannot be resolved by our study but does beckon further 
research. 
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Appendix 
ACF and PACF diagrams 
The ACF and PACF for all dependent variables, GDP_AVGHR, K_AVGHR and TFPG, are 
presented for both groups of countries. As is shown they all support using an AR(1) model. 
Developed 
Figure 3 - GDP_AVGHR 
 
 
Figure 4 - K_AVGHR 
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Figure 5 - TFPG 
 
Emerging 
Figure 6 - GDP_AVGHR 
 
 
Figure 7 - K_AVGHR 
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Figure 8 - TFPG 
 
Sample 
Developed countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
 
Emerging countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
 
  
 
